

SECURITY OPERATIONS SOP

A Rifle Company in Bosnia

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While the conflict raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s, U.S. forces in Europe prepared for possible deployment to that region. The missions they trained for ranged from humanitarian relief to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and high intensity conflict. In 1994 elements of the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, Airborne Battalion Combat Team (now 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry) and its parent headquarters, the Southern European Task Force's Lion Brigade, deployed to Rwanda during Operation *Support Hope* to conduct humanitarian relief operations. In 1995 they deployed from Italy to Germany and participated in two Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotations that included peacekeeping and security operations, and two full-up Mission Rehearsal Exercises for the possible extraction of United Nations forces from enclaves in Bosnia. At the end of this training in November, policy for U.S. involvement in the area changed, and the 3d Battalion was alerted to deploy as part of a NATO peacekeeping force that would enforce the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.

The purpose of this article is to show how one American rifle company conducted security operations in the demanding operational environment that faced the first U.S. combat unit to enter that troubled land. The article will concentrate on the initial main gate of Tuzla Airbase, which was a chokepoint and—until the Sava River was bridged—the only lifeline connecting NATO and the U.S. to Bosnia.

The U.S. troops and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) faced threats that varied in scope and capability. The

factions were still entrenched along the Line of Confrontation within the Zone of Separation and had access to a variety of armored vehicles, artillery, and heavy weapons. Several Mujahadeen with terrorist backgrounds remained in sector who wanted the “holy” war in Bosnia to continue and were therefore against the deployment of NATO and the United States.

The land mine threat was also very real. Thousands of marked and unmarked antiarmor and antipersonnel minefields littered the countryside, and specifically Tuzla Airbase. Local “police” factions and gangs roamed Tuzla and wielded unchecked power. Illegal checkpoints, celebratory firing of small arms and mortars, and thievery were the norm. Break-ins at Tuzla Airbase to steal food, parts, and other supplies remained a daily occurrence.

After waiting nearly a week for the weather to clear, elements of the battalion deployed from Aviano, Italy, on C-130s headed to Bosnia. These forces landed at Tuzla Airbase on the evening of December 18, 1995 as part of Task Force Eagle, IFOR, and NATO during Operation *Joint Endeavor*. As the first U.S. combat force to enter Bosnia, the 3d Battalion's mission was twofold. The stated mission was to relieve UN forces and secure the perimeter of Tuzla Airbase to allow follow-on mechanized, armor, and logistics forces to move to the Zone of Separation between factions in Bosnia. An important implied mission was to send a strong signal to all factions that IFOR was a capable, combat-ready force. The battalion would send an immediate and clear

message to Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, and the world that U.S. and NATO troops were on the ground and in charge.

The first demonstration of this transfer of authority from the UN to NATO occurred at the main gate of Tuzla Airbase. Company C of the battalion conducted a relief in place and secured three combat outposts (COPs) on the northern portion of the airbase. Instead of existing United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) checkpoints, the battalion established platoon-sized combat outposts on all main avenues of approach into the airbase that were well dug-in and obstacled, stocked with ammunition, and capable of continuous operations for weeks or even months. The main effort was focused on COP Foxtrot, the main gate to Tuzla Airbase and the only entrance and exit used for the first 60 days.


COP Foxtrot was a high traffic area and was deluged with reporters, press stands, and cameras from numerous U.S. and international news organizations. Company C's first platoon relieved the sparse UN element at the gate, which consisted of less than a squad of soldiers from a Swedish infantry company within UNPROFOR. The relief of the Swedish soldiers constituted the unofficial transfer of authority from the UN to NATO. Thus began the overnight transformation of the main gate from a simple entrance and exit point to a fully resourced and fortified combat outpost, capable of both defending the airbase and controlling access in and out of it.

On D-Day the clear intent that IFOR communicated to the battalion was that the local populace, the press, and the world would clearly witness the demonstration of force and have no doubt that the IFOR and NATO had taken charge.

During that first night, the company and battalion focused the priority of logistical effort and support to the main gate. With no organic vehicles available to haul precious barrier material, the battalion borrowed various assets from the UN and local contractors. During the ten hours of darkness, vehicles and countless barrier materials (dump trucks, wood, sandbags, wire, digging tools) were obtained through the sheer will and ingenuity of officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted soldiers. By morning, the main gate had bunkers, fighting positions, obstacles, and a platoon's worth of soldiers executing the IFOR mission. During the next 70 days, continuous improvement took place while the company developed an extensive tactical standing operating procedure (SOP) for combat outpost operations.

Company Operations

The three Company C COPs along the airbase perimeter were 600 to 1,000 meters apart. Each was tasked to secure its COP to prevent unauthorized access along a high-speed avenue of approach. Critical to mission success was extensive



patrolling along the fence line to deny penetration. Patrol routes were designated for the COPs. With one squad occupying the COP at all times, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) squad was responsible for executing the patrol schedule using team or squad-sized elements. The longer patrol routes between COPs required that platoons alternate patrols with the platoons to their left and right. Company commanders coordinated these schedules because patrol routes crossed platoon and company boundaries. By alternating platoon responsibility as well as patrol start times and routes, commanders ensured that the perimeter patrols could not be predicted. This proved essential, because of the large distances between COPs.

Once the battalion established a battle rhythm, platoons conducted dismounted off-base patrols through Tuzla and the surrounding countryside to further demonstrate a show of force. The patrols varied as to location, distance, and time. Some patrolled near local military and faction headquarters, while others patrolled near the locations of recent firing incidents. Each patrol reported specifics about weapons, personnel, battle damage, and civilian reactions to the patrol, as well as any specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) designated for the patrol.

The two remaining platoons in the company increased their security posture to 100 percent and took over the patrolling platoon's COP responsibilities. Off-base platoon patrols stretched company resources, and permitted each company to conduct only four or five patrols a week. An entire platoon conducted the daily operations of the main gate, leaving Company C with only two platoons to conduct off-base patrols. Given these missions and the personnel constraints, each remaining platoon could manage just one off-base patrol a week.

Main Gate Operations

The 1st Platoon consisted of three elements (squads plus), which rotated through their duties at COP Foxtrot. The first was the Gate element, composed of one complete squad, an M60 machinegun crew, two military policemen, and an M3 Bradley with crew. During peak hours at the gate, additional attachments might include an MP or Air Force SP bomb dog with handler, Bosnian police, and a local national interpreter.

The second element was the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), composed of one squad that was kept on standby to reinforce the gate as needed. This element kept its combat equipment within arms reach at all times and was also responsible for

SAMPLE ROTATION SCHEDULE

DATE	TIME	ELEMENT		
		GATE	QRF	DOWN
2	Midnight-Noon	3d	2d	1st
Jan	Noon-Midnight	1st	3d	2d
3	Midnight-Noon	2d	1st	3d
Jan	Noon-Midnight	3d	2d	1st
4	Midnight-Noon	1st	3d	2d
Jan	Noon-Midnight	2d	1st	3d
5	Midnight-Noon	3d	2d	1st
Jan	Noon-Midnight	1st	3d	2d

EQUIPMENT

Checkpoint Commander—9mm, AN/PRC-126, green star cluster.
Security SL—M16, PRC-126, green star cluster.
Tower Security—M16/M203, TA-1 (wire), SINCGARS, PRC-126, binoculars, PVS-7, PAQ-4B, laser pointer, video camera.
Guard Shack—SINCGARS, landline switchboard, additional star clusters and parachute flares, base passes.
Exit Lane Guard—M16/M203.
Fence Line Guards—9mm/M16, mirrors on rods, 6-8 foot wooden probing rods.
Bunker Security—M249 SAW, M203/M16.
MP Shack—9mm, metal detectors, access rosters.
Machine Gun Bunker—M60 MG, PRC-126.

conducting all required local patrols along the fence line near COP Foxtrot. Additionally, this element continuously improved the platoon's positions and maintained the obstacles at COP Foxtrot. The third element was the Down element, which consisted of one squad, an M60 crew, and a checkpoint commander. This element conducted personal hygiene, executed its rest plan, and conducted any necessary personal business.

When rotating to the Gate element, soldiers from the incoming squad physically assumed duties before the outgoing Gate element was relieved. Once outgoing soldiers had briefed their replacements on the previous shift's significant activities, all outgoing soldiers removed their magazines from their weapons, cleared their weapons under the supervision of their squad leader, and dry-fired into a weapons clearing barrel.

Elements rotated every 12 hours. Though 8-hour shifts were used successfully, 12-hour shifts gave an air of predictability over extended periods of time and allowed the soldiers to both execute their rest plan and take care of personal business during their down cycle. Since soldier fatigue and complacency could easily arise with 12-hour shifts, the Gate element rotated from the down cycle to ensure soldiers were sharp at the gate. The Gate element rotated to QRF, and QRF to Down element. Risk was assumed in the QRF element with up to half of the element executing a rest plan, fully

clothed and next to their weapons and equipment, in a bomb shelter less than 50 meters from the gate.

Either the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant served as the COP commander, who was responsible for the entire platoon sector including the gate, CP, attachments, patrol routes, and resource requirements. Within the COP commander's control was the checkpoint commander (a staff sergeant squad leader) and a security squad leader (senior sergeant team leader). The checkpoint commander was responsible for routine operations and overall security at the gate. He coordinated as necessary with local national interpreters, Bosnian police, and attachments (Bradley crews and MPs) working the gate. The security squad leader was primarily responsible for the organic assets manning the gate: M60 machinegun team, search personnel, guards, bunkers, and the sniper.

The gate positions were continuously manned by nine to ten personnel organic to 1st Platoon (see sketch). Bunkers 1 and 2 were each occupied by one squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner who was oriented on one of the two entrance and exit lanes. Two fence-line guards conducted random

searches of UN vehicles, detailed searches of all civilian vehicles, and ensured that all IFOR vehicles exiting the airbase met the convoy security requirements of the 1st Armored Division (1AD). Depending on the time of day, one or two exit guards maintained traffic flow, ensured that civilians kept a safe distance from the gate, and acted as early warning in case vehicles attempted to break through.

Two soldiers manned an M60 position that overwatched the fence-line chokepoint and acted as the second line of defense in case of a mounted or dismounted breach of the gate. One soldier occupied a 50-foot observation tower in front of the main gate to act as early warning for the eastern and western avenues of approach. Lastly, one soldier occupied the guard shack and was responsible for maintaining landline communication with 1AD's provost marshal office (PMO) and issuing passes to contract civilian workers who routinely entered and exited the airbase.

Attachments included one or two armored vehicles that provided depth to the COP and acted as a last line of defense in the event of a breakthrough. Initially, the Swedish infantry company provided infantry personnel carriers for this task until 1AD moved its first company of Bradleys into the compound. One or two U.S. military police soldiers assisted with identification checks and personnel searches, and an MP/SP with dog assisted with vehicular searches. Soon after occupation, a rotation of interpreters and legitimate Bosnian police from the local area translated and helped quell any disturbances or disagreements at the main gate.

Daily Operations

Identification Procedures. One of the most difficult tasks for soldiers working the gate was identifying personnel entering and exiting the airbase each day. They had to examine many types of identification cards—each of which mandated different procedures. U.S. military personnel carried standard green U.S. Armed Forces ID cards or IFOR ID cards. Those entering on foot were checked for photo likeness and match between the name on the ID card and the name on the battle dress uniform (BDU), and were allowed to carry weapons with magazines out, yet were not subject to search. Checking the photo against the BDU was necessary because U.S. BDUs were sometimes lost or stolen from local laundry contractors and used by Bosnians. The ranking individual of each U.S. military vehicle entering the gate was checked by the same standards and had to vouch for all passengers. Convoy commanders had to identify the number and type of vehicles in the convoy and ensure that mounted weapons were locked and cleared.

Holders of UN-issued blue ID cards were treated much like U.S. soldiers. In the Tuzla area, the blue UN ID cards were carried primarily by British, Swedish, and Norwegian troops and were eventually phased out and replaced by IFOR ID cards. Entrance search requirements for IFOR cardholders were the same as for U.S. soldiers. UN ID cards issued to civilians were yellow, orange, and white. Since these were not controlled military ID cards, UN ID holders underwent an MP-controlled hand-held metal detector search as well as the photo-face ID match. Once searched, they were

allowed on base unescorted. These ID cards were accepted through January 1996, when all of the controlled, blue UN ID cards were issued.

Non-UN, local civilians were allowed on base for legitimate contract work, such as trash removal, mess and janitorial duties, and interpreting. The MPs examined personal IDs and searched these civilians using metal detectors. Once the soldier operating the guard shack had searched a civilian, he exchanged the local national's personal ID for a temporary base pass. The workers were temporarily held at the gate and the appropriate military agency on base was contacted to physically escort them to their place of work. At the end of the day, all workers left before last light and exchanged their passes for their personal ID cards as they left. The same method was used for personnel of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. This provided a way to track civilians and make sure the base was clear by nightfall.

The arrival of NATO, and controlled access to the base, was a shock for UN personnel who had been able to come and go at will. They found it irritating to wait for entrance and have their vehicles, packages, and persons searched. Almost daily there would be instances where UN workers refused to be searched. In such cases, soldiers politely explained that entrance requirements had changed for security reasons. Those who refused to be searched were not allowed on base and were asked to leave the main gate area. Those who provoked confrontation tested the patience of those on the gate and it took self-control and restraint by soldiers under stress to control the situation. If tirades got out of hand, the PMO was notified and MPs were detailed to detain those causing the disturbance. The soldiers knew that if they lost self-control or if a confrontation turned violent, their mission would fail.

The press people were often the most challenging group to work with. Continuous coverage of the main gate and numerous press stanchions complicated daily operations. Press personnel were admitted to the base only with Joint Information Bureau (JIB) escort. Individual press personnel attempting to enter the base without escort were searched with metal detectors and held while the JIB was contacted. The JIB then verified that the individual was from the press and provided a public affairs officer (PAO) escort. Often the JIB would fill a bus with press personnel to enter the base. The PAO who escorted the bus verified the identification of all press personnel aboard and vouched for them upon entering the base.

The activities of press personnel just outside the gate were acceptable so long as they did not adversely affect the security posture. To accommodate the press, reporters and cameras were allowed to operate around the main gate. Often several organizations used this hub as a backdrop for their nightly reports.

Occasionally though, the press would push beyond the limits of the invitation and get in the way. A few times, they jeopardized their own safety by trying to get the perfect shot. Press personnel who had cameras with blinding lights, who blocked the view of soldiers manning the gate, and whose

interviews hindered gate operations were politely asked to cease work. Refusal to obey the requests of the checkpoint commander constituted a security risk. Unruly press personnel were detained, had their press passes confiscated, and were turned over to the JIB where an incident report was filed. The effect of press operations on security at the main gate was left to the judgment of the checkpoint commander.

It was in our best interest to embrace the press, because they portrayed the message of the mission to the world. We wanted this to be a message of U.S. troops keeping the peace between the warring factions, providing humanitarian relief, and saving lives through the execution of their mission. Therefore, during hours of limited traffic flow, interviews of soldiers at the main gate were permitted, and press personnel were granted access to areas that provided interview backdrop. This helped our relations with the press and also allowed the Army to showcase its best salesman, the soldier.

Individual Searches. MPs conducted personnel searches using a hand-held metal detector while another soldier kept overwatch from a bunker. Only the COP commander could authorize pat-down searches, and a female MP conducted pat-down searches of females. During the search, personnel stood with their hands outstretched to their sides and were scanned from head to toe with the metal detector. Metal items and all bags were also inspected and any contraband was confiscated. Anyone who refused to be searched was not allowed on base and, although some tried to claim it, nobody had "diplomatic immunity" that would give them freedom from being searched.

As a general rule, no local area civilian vehicles were allowed on base. The only exceptions to this rule were trucks essential to base support operations, such as those hauling garbage, sand, or gravel. Due to the large number of UN vehicles entering the base, vehicular searches were random. Each day the checkpoint commander would draw a number between five and ten to determine the routine search pattern. Each designated vehicle would then be directed to the search area and inspected.

Vehicle Searches. Vehicles searched varied according to the driver and passengers in the vehicle. UN military and IFOR vehicles were allowed free passage once the ranking person had his IFOR or U.S. military identification card examined for photo likeness. In accordance with IAD policy, all U.S. IFOR vehicles were required to have at least four vehicles in the convoy, two personnel in each vehicle, and at least one M16 per vehicle. Every UN civilian vehicle was subject to a visual search of the exterior and interior, and a

Vehicle Search Checklist

- 1. All personnel exit vehicle.**
- 2. Driver opens doors, hood, and trunk and empties vehicle of all packages. One soldier with pistol searches while other provides overwatch with M16.**
- 3. Begin search at the engine compartment. Look for new wires to indicate possible explosives. Look for wires or tampering in area of glove box. Look under/behind seats and feel seat backs for packages/protrusions. Feel headliner and door panels for protrusions. Inspect under dashboard and carpets for wires. Inspect trunk and spare tire area.**
- 4. Have driver/passengers open all packages (if possible have bomb dog inspect). Inspect gas tank with wooden probing rod/dipstick if possible, feeling for soft, solid material. Inspect bumpers, wheels, and complete chassis. Inspect all truck beds with wooden probing rod (pushing through sand and gravel). Have bomb dog search entire vehicle when possible.**
- 5. Bring anything suspicious to the attention of the checkpoint commander.**

detailed search if it fell within the random search number or appeared suspicious. Non-UN civilian vehicles and host-nation vehicles had to be cleared on base by the PMO. Once cleared, each one underwent a detailed physical search.

Passes. Passes were issued to all personnel who did not have UN, U.S. military, or press ID. Individuals were escorted to the guard shack for passes after being searched by the MPs at the security point. Personnel were then required to state the purpose of their visit, identify their points of contact (POCs) on base, and present their local, personal picture IDs to the soldier at the guard shack. Once contacted, the agency POC within the base sent an escort to pick up the individuals at the gate and assume responsibility for them. While waiting for passes to be issued and the escort to arrive, the fence-line guards executed a detailed search of the vehicle. Again, IDs were examined for photo likeness. Finally, before a pass was issued, the pass number, individual's name, stated business, agency POC, and time of arrival were logged for tracking purposes.

Upon leaving the base, individuals were required to get out of their vehicle at the fence line to return their passes in exchange for their personal IDs. In instances where individuals made several trips in and out of the base each day, such as sand, gravel, and garbage runs, passes could be retained until the close of business. This did not preclude the individuals and their vehicles from being searched every time they entered the base. In cases where a pass was out for over 24 hours, the personal ID was turned in and a report filed with the PMO. The numbered pass then became invalid. Individuals who tried to enter with an invalid pass were detained and handed over to the PMO for investigation.

Traffic Procedures. As seen in the sketch, the main gate could be accessed from two separate lanes that ran from the main road outside the base. These lanes converged at the gate and naturally developed into separate entrance and exit lanes. To prevent high-speed breakthroughs at the gate, chicanes (alternating wall obstacles that required several turns to navigate) and fabricated speed bumps were employed on both lanes. The chicanes were developed using a British-made product called Hesco Bastion walls. The chicane on the western lane was more restrictive because it provided no natural turns before reaching the gate. The eastern lane, which had a natural sharp turn just before the entrance, had a less restrictive chicane. The eastern lane was also used for both entrance and exit by unusually long or wide vehicles that would not fit through the western lane.

The portable frame walls were made of chain-link wire

and lined with canvas. They were made in sections and folded out to form a topless 4'x4' box, 5 feet high, that could be filled with sand or gravel. Each section connected to the next, making it possible to choose walls of various lengths. They could also be stacked to provide additional cover. These were essential in the construction of obstacles and above-the-ground bunkers (Tuzla had a very high water table) and helped provide cover for the guards conducting daily operations at the main gate. Through the use of dozers and small emplacement excavators (SEEs), these portable frame walls reduced bunker and obstacle construction time by a factor of ten.

The entrance and exit lanes for all vehicle traffic were switched at random to keep from establishing a pattern. The number of times the lanes were switched each day was also random. From 1800 to 2300 daily, after most of the daytime traffic had subsided, one of the lanes was further restricted and not used. From 2300-0600 the entire main gate closed and opened only for an occasional convoy that left the base or returned.

During the weekdays, traffic flow peaked between 0800 and 1000 hours. During this time, 200-300 vehicles would enter and 100-200 would depart. Typically, 50-100 personnel entered on foot. Monday morning traffic was particularly heavy, and it was not unusual to have a 100-meter line of vehicles waiting to enter. This caused many tempers to flare and pressured the soldiers conducting searches to hurry their work. This was the most confusing and dangerous time of the day and was treated as the daily main effort. A beefed up leadership presence was necessary to deal with those who were belligerent, and to ensure that all searches were thorough. The pace for the remainder of the day steadied to a manageable 15-20 vehicles per hour. The peak flow of local workers began around 1600 and generally finished by 1700. The rest of the day and night traffic flow diminished to less than 10 vehicles per hour.

Sustained Operations

Once the primary fighting positions were completed, the emplacement of alternate positions and obstacles began. Both alternate and supplemental positions supported the COPs on the flanks and in depth. A series of unannounced alerts and announced drills tested each COP on the Contingency Plans and the QRFs ability to react, assess, and support the personnel manning the COP.

The high volume of traffic at the main gate demanded continuous maintenance. The obstacle walls damaged by vehicles navigating the chicanes had to be replaced routinely. Cement and sand bag speed bumps lasted only a few days. Bunkers needed to be fixed and concertina wire replaced.

The two other platoons in the company couldn't help because each had its own portion of the airfield perimeter to secure, in addition to ramped-up patrol schedules. Each of them conducted platoon-size patrols outside the airfield once or twice a week, which required one platoon to fall in on the other's sector.

Since they were stretched thin, the company headquarters section brought supplies to the gate and a combination of

QRF and Down element personnel were in charge of gate maintenance. Over time, maintenance of the gate area became so difficult that 1st Platoon's alternating fence-line patrol duties were tasked to the platoons on its left and right.

Quality of life improvements also became important. During conditions of extreme cold, warmth was an issue on the static positions of the COPs. Kerosene heaters were placed in each bunker and guard position. Roving guards were allowed five-minute breaks in a heated bunker or building. Living quarters included buildings, GP Medium tents, and evacuated aircraft hangars. Wooden floors and pot belly stoves were put in the tents. Cots and beds from the airbase were used wherever possible. Access to contractor-built shower, gym, and PX facilities soon became important to the morale of the soldiers. Dissemination of "any soldier" mail also helped to keep spirits up.

VIP visits to all the COPs soon became routine, and visitors ranged from field grade officers within the battalion to the President of the United States. These visitors, including the press, became a part of the mission itself and could not be discounted. During high-level visits, security for the principal visitor was the main concern. Heightened alert status, increased patrol activity, and cross-leveled manpower between COPs became necessary. For unplanned visits, leaders from team through platoon levels had to be prepared to brief their situation, mission, execution of operations at the COP, and recent activities.

Avoiding complacency became a factor on all COPs. Patrolling outside the airbase broke up the monotony. For 1st Platoon, however, patrolling was not possible. Although it was busier than any other COP, its duties began to get routine and mundane. After 50 days operating the main gate, there wasn't much the soldiers hadn't seen. Alerts were useful in combating this, but over time they worried about failing to anticipate the unexpected. As a result, 1st Platoon and 3d Platoon rotated COPs. This provided each with a new mission they attacked with vigor; it minimized complacency, and the change reduced chances of an unfortunate incident.

All of the training conducted before the deployment proved invaluable. Generally, the company's focus was on its wartime mission essential task list and small-unit basics—tasks and drills from ARTEP 7-8 MTP and FM 7-8 DRILL. The peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks were trained only when the battalion was alerted for missions outside the high intensity spectrum. During the year before deployment, the company had performed nine maneuver live fires at the platoon or squad level. Some of these included tasks in an urban environment. This realistic training developed small-unit leaders and teams that kept their discipline and confidence when they headed into the urban sprawl of Tuzla.

Once alerted for imminent deployment, the unit switched its focus to individual and team peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks such as *react to civil disturbance*, *mine avoidance/mine clearance*, *demonstrate show of force*, *control crowd*, *disarm belligerents*, and *react to media*. These tasks were trained on tough, realistic lanes that included an opposing force, role players, and observer-controllers. In addition to the tasks, each lane emphasized rules of engage-

CONTINGENCY PLANS

Suspicious Vehicles or Individuals.

Individuals on foot or in vehicles are noticed paying unusual attention to activities at the gate. This includes several drive-bys by a particular vehicle, vehicles parked near the gate for long periods, and individuals who linger outside the gate and watch gate operations.

- The first guard to notice the unusual activity informs the Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.

- A detailed description of the individual(s)/vehicle, license plate number, time vicinity the gate, and activity is noted on a suspicious incident report in the guard shack.

- The video camera is used to record the suspicious activity and to act as a deterrent.

- If subject continues to linger, Bosnian Military Police officer or U.S. security detail w/interpreter questions subject as to intent and business.

- Spot report is sent to higher detailing activity.

Mob In Street. An armed or unarmed mob that assembles or riots outside the gate. Bosnian Military Police are unable to defuse the situation. The assembly's anger is directed toward the gate, airbase, or IFOR personnel.

- All personnel seek cover.

- QRF is alerted and deployed, remainder of platoon is alerted.

- Report submitted to higher, request assistance as needed.

- All traffic is diverted to another gate.

- Bosnian Military Policeman is asked to inform his higher HQ and request assistance.

- If mob becomes violent, attempt to use non-lethal deterrents. Laser pointers, bomb dog scare tactics, videotape crowd, identify and detain ringleaders.

- Platoon prepares to protect airfield from gate penetration by forming protective line.

- COP Commander may authorize warning shots.

- Use necessary deadly force IAW ROEs.

Shooting Near Gate. Individuals outside the perimeter fire shots within sight of the gate.

- All personnel seek cover.

- If firing is directed away from the airbase no action is authorized, but subject firing will be monitored (hundreds of small arms firing incidents can be heard each day and are normal).

- Shots directed toward the airbase may be answered with warning shots authorized by the Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.

- Deadly force is not authorized unless aimed fire and hostile intent is displayed.

- Videotape and report the situation.

Drive-By Shooting. A semiautomatic, automatic, or shoulder-fired weapon is fired toward the gate or airfield from a moving vehicle.

- All roving personnel immediately seek cover.

- Security personnel in bunker positions open fire on vehicle only if they have clear, unobstructed line of fire. Traffic, pedestrians, and houses must be taken into consideration.

- QRF is alerted and deployed.

- Report is submitted to higher.

- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

- Gate is shut down to all but military convoy traffic until area is confirmed safe.

Sniper. Aimed, individual shots are detected that likely emanate from a static position.

- All roving personnel immediately seek cover.

- Security personnel in bunker positions attempt to locate muzzle flash or smoke signature.

- If source is positively identified, the Checkpoint Commander may authorize personnel with M16s and clear line of fire to return fire on the sniper position.

- QRF is alerted and deployed.

- Report is submitted to higher, QRF prepares to patrol for sniper position.

- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

- Gate is shut down to all traffic until sniper fire ceases and sniper position is cleared.

Gate Roll-Through. A vehicle rolls through the front gate and hostile intent is not clear. Normally a simple misunderstanding where the vehicle must be stopped but deadly force is not necessary.

- All personnel call out "ROAD BLOCK" three times and give vehicle description by shouting and using PRC-126 radio.

- Closest personnel attempt to physically intercept vehicle and wave it to a stop.

- Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader may authorize use of warning shots.

- Remaining personnel move to covered positions until vehicle's intent is determined.

- M3 Bradley receives road block message FM and physically blocks road. Electrical safe will not be disengaged until a hostile act is witnessed.

Gate Ram. A vehicle intentionally runs through the obstacles and front gate and attempts to penetrate the airfield perimeter. Hostile intentions are not in doubt.

- All personnel call out "BUST" three times and give vehicle description by shouting and using PRC-126 radio.

- Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader fires green star cluster.

- Guard shack guard switches SINC-GARS to channel 1 (CO CMD) and repeats bust message. Land line is used as alternate.

- Exposed personnel on gate go to nearest dive positions

- SAW in bunker #2 opens fire if possible.

- M60 position receives message FM, locks and loads, opens fire on vehicle as it

passes through gate.

- M3 Bradley receives bust message FM, physically blocks road while simultaneously firing with coax machinegun.

- QRF is alerted and deployed.

- Report is submitted to higher.

- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

Car Bomb. A search team (dog or human) detects the possible presence of an explosive device in a vehicle.

- Search team alerts Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.

- Driver and passengers are taken into custody and moved to platoon CP.

- Gate is shut down and barricaded from traffic in both directions.

- M3 Bradley blocks road to prevent traffic from approaching gate from inside the base.

- All personnel on the checkpoint seek covered positions and the tower is vacated.

- All FM traffic vicinity the gate is restricted and landline is utilized.

- Report is submitted to higher, EOD is notified.

- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

Subject Attempts to Escape Airbase.

The platoon is alerted and the platoon sector is 100% occupied.

- All vehicles and personnel attempting to exit the main gate are required to present ID.

- Special attention is paid to personnel or vehicles matching description of subject.

- Personnel on the fence line are stopped, questioned, and told to move away from the airbase.

- If the subject is positively identified, the SL may order a security detail to chamber a round prior to moving to apprehend the subject.

- If apprehended, detain, place under guard, report, and await evacuation to higher or the PMO.

Dismounted Assault. An organized, military style assault is conducted against the airbase.

- The platoon is alerted and 100% of the sector is occupied.

- All personnel chamber a round on order of the COP Commander. Open-bolt weapons go to the open bolt position.

- As per ROE, a tactical movement of troops constitutes hostile intent, therefore advances against the airbase may be engaged before the enemy opens fire.

- Report and adjust the perimeter (to include M3 Bradley) as the situation dictates.

Indirect Fire. An artillery or mortar round impacts in the vicinity of the airbase. Alternately, a REDLEG alert is received from the Q37 radar indicating rounds are inbound.

- All personnel seek cover.

- The gate is shut down to all traffic.

- All rounds that impact within sight of the checkpoint are reported and counted.

ment and force protection at all times. Only when units and individuals were certified across a broad spectrum of peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks were they given the go-ahead to deploy.

Another lesson learned from Bosnia was the importance of capturing lessons learned and developing SOPs on the ground. The combat outpost SOP developed during the first few months at Tuzla Airbase was captured on paper and updated continuously. It was tested and adjusted as necessary through bottom up input. Eventually, the SOP developed at Tuzla Airbase was disseminated through the 1st Armored Division and used as a baseline for COP development by follow-on units throughout the American sector.

Mission experience during peace-keeping or peace enforcement operations is very beneficial to post-deployment high-intensity retraining and future deployments in any operational environment. The cognitive skills the soldiers gain can complement many missions and tasks. Improvements can be seen in the staff application of the military decision making process, leader decision making skills, and individual soldier tasks and discipline. The ability to apply rules of engagement pertains to the entire spectrum of warfare. Security operations, contingency planning, fighting position and obstacle construction, and rehearsals are all invaluable in any operational environment.

Soon after redeployment to Italy, the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, including Company C, was alerted for immediate deployment to Monrovia, Liberia. Along with 10th Special Operations Forces, these soldiers conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. Embassy personnel. The experience gained and the cohesion developed during the deployment to Bosnia proved invaluable during the performance of this highly successful NEO.

Looking back, the immediate change in standards and the visible sign that NATO and IFOR brought to the COPs and the main gate were essential. They sent an unmistakable signal to all in the area and to the world that IFOR was in charge and that its soldiers were professionals. This tone helped set the stage for successful peace enforcement in the war-torn region and marked the beginning of a change in a region long torn by ethnic war. This resulted in countless lives saved and a lasting peace that has brought stability to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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